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The Political Constitution of Emergency 
Powers: Some Lessons from Hamdan 
Mark Tushnet† 
Scholars of constitutional law located in law schools inevi-
tably gravitate toward the courts. For us, what the courts say 
about the Constitution is at the heart of our constitutional or-
der.1 Not surprisingly, then, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld2 received a great deal of scholarly atten-
tion.3 Hamdan’s rhetoric reinforced its assertion of the central-
ity of the courts in the constitutional order.4 And yet, Hamdan 
may be more important for what it says about the political as-
pects of the constitutional order. On analysis, Hamdan changed 
the political dynamics associated with the law of emergency 
powers without changing the legal terrain (as conventionally 
understood) one whit.5 In doing so the decision—and, more im-
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  1.  This is true even as we acknowledge the existence of aspects of the 
constitutional order that lie beyond the ken of the courts. We relegate those 
aspects to the margins of our concern, calling them political questions and at-
tempting to domesticate—that is, reduce the scope of—that category. For my 
analysis, see Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: 
The Transformation and Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine, 80 
N.C. L. REV. 1203, 1203–06 (2002). 
  2.  126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
  3.  For example, an April 6, 2007 search of the Westlaw “Journals and 
Law Reviews” database revealed twenty-six scholarly pieces with “Hamdan” in 
the title. 
  4. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2798 (“[I]n undertaking to try Hamdan and 
subject him to criminal punishment, the Executive is bound to comply with the 
Rule of Law that prevails in this jurisdiction.”). 
  5.  Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule describe Hamdan as a decision 
handed down “after an emergency has run its course.” ERIC  A.  POSNER  & 
ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE TUSHNET_4FMT 6/15/2007 9:28:30 AM 
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portant, the political reaction to the decision—helps us under-
stand the way in which the constitutional law of emergency 
powers is (primarily) political rather than legal. 
The  substantive  law of emergency powers specifies what 
the executive can do to whom when there are rationally indis-
putable major threats to the continued stable operation of a 
democratic nation’s political and social order.6 My argument 
turns on the proposition, not difficult to establish in my view, 
that  Hamdan deals solely with the procedural law of emer-
gency powers, that is, with the mechanisms by which the ex-
ecutive obtains substantive authorities. All that Hamdan holds 
is that no statute authorized the President to establish military 
tribunals, with the characteristics laid out in the President’s 
order, to try persons held as unlawful combatants.7 Without a 
statute authorizing such tribunals, the Court held, the Presi-
dent could establish only tribunals with characteristics that 
satisfied the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions.8 It is apparent on the face of the Hamdan opin-
ions—that is, Justice John Paul Stevens’s majority opinion on 
most issues,9 his plurality opinion on another,10 and Justice 
Anthony Kennedy’s opinion concurring in the result on the 
former11—that Congress could authorize the creation of the tri-
 
COURTS 272 (2007). It would follow, I think, that Hamdan does not shed light 
on the judicially constructed law of emergency powers during emergencies (al-
though it still might shed light on the political constitution of emergency pow-
ers during emergencies). Posner and Vermeule make their observation in the 
service of a broader argument that courts are quite deferential to executive 
decision-making power during emergencies and less deferential when emer-
gencies have ended. Id. at 15–57. Their other examples involve situations in 
which there is some reasonable marker for the emergency’s termination, such 
as a surrender or armistice. Id. at 165–66. In the absence of such a marker, 
determining when “an emergency has run its course” is a matter of judgment, 
and Posner and Vermeule’s judgment seems to me driven as much by the con-
clusion they seek to support as by any independent evidence. 
  6.  I use this definition to exclude from the subject, as I believe proper, 
questions that arise from the exercise of power during what Kim Lane Schep-
pele calls “small emergencies.” See Kim Lane Scheppele, Small Emergencies, 
40 GA. L. REV. 835, 835–36 (2006). In doing so, I do not mean to suggest that 
examination of the legal order in small emergencies cannot illuminate our un-
derstanding of the legal order during larger ones. 
  7. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2775. 
  8. Id. at 2786. Put another way, according to the Court, existing statutes 
prohibited the President from creating commissions that did not satisfy those 
requirements. 
  9. Id. at 2773–75. 
  10. Id. at 2779–80. 
  11. Id. at 2799 (Kennedy, J., concurring). TUSHNET_4FMT 6/15/2007 9:28:30 AM 
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bunals the President had created, without running into any ob-
jections expressly identified in Hamdan.12 
What Hamdan did, of course, was change one aspect of the 
status quo.13 After the decision as before, the President could 
have used existing court-martial procedures as the basis for the 
rules governing trials of unlawful combatants. But after the de-
cision, unlike the situation before it, the President had to ob-
tain congressional authorization for the creation of military tri-
bunals that departed from the requirements of the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice and, perhaps, Common Article 3.14 Ini-
tially, the administration appeared to believe that doing so 
would be relatively simple. It turned out to be a bit more com-
plicated, for reasons that illuminate what I call the political 
constitution of emergency powers. 
I.  HAMDAN IN THE SUPREME COURT   
The facts and holdings of Hamdan are well-known, and I 
summarize only the portion of the Court’s opinion that casts 
light on the political constitution of emergency powers. The 
administration had created military tribunals that, so the 
Court held, did not conform to the requirement of Article 21 in 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)15 that military 
tribunals of the sort involved in Hamdan must comply with the 
requirements of the law of war.16 The Court held that the 
President lacked congressional authorization to dispense with 
 
  12.  As I discuss below, Hamdan did not rule out the possibility that there 
might be other objections to tribunals with the characteristics of those created 
by the President. 
  13.  I focus in this Article on the relation between Hamdan and the issue 
of military commissions. By giving the President an incentive to press forward 
with legislative proposals dealing with such commissions, Hamdan also pro-
vided an opportunity for the President and members of Congress to advance 
policy proposals only loosely related to the one specifically at issue in Ham-
dan. Put in more general terms, unsettling the status quo with respect to a 
single matter can sometimes unsettle issues in some roughly bounded 
neighborhood. 
  14. Cf. Neal Kumar Katyal, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy 
Goes to Practice, 120 HARV.  L.  REV.  65,  95–96  (2006)  (observing that the 
Court’s decision meant that the President had to obtain a majority vote from 
Congress, whereas a decision in favor of the administration would have re-
quired a Congress that disagreed with the President to achieve majorities 
large enough to overcome a presidential veto). 
  15.  10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000). 
  16. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2803 (Kennedy, J., concurring). TUSHNET_4FMT 6/15/2007 9:28:30 AM 
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compliance with the law of war.17 The administration claimed 
that legislation enacted after the UCMJ—the Authorization for 
the Use of Military Force18 (AUMF) against al-Qaeda and those 
associated with it, and the Detainee Treatment Act of 200519—
did provide the requisite authority.20 The Court disagreed. The 
AUMF did not “even hint[] that Congress intended to expand 
or alter the authorization set forth in Article 21 of the 
UCMJ.”21 Nor did the Detainee Treatment Act contain lan-
guage bearing on the rules to be used in military tribunals; all 
it did was assume that such tribunals existed, and structure 
the process for reviewing decisions by such tribunals.22 
The next question was whether the procedures to be used 
in the tribunals as then structured were consistent with the 
UCMJ.23 The government relied on a provision in the UCMJ 
that required “rules” under the UCMJ to be “uniform insofar as 
practicable.”24 The Court held that “the ‘practicability’ determi-
nation the President has made is insufficient to justify vari-
ances from the procedures governing courts-martial.”25 The 
President  had specifically found that it was impracticable to 
conform the rules to those in ordinary criminal trials in civilian 
Article III courts,26 but had said nothing about the practicabil-
ity of conforming the rules to those used in courts-martial. And, 
the Court held, the record before it, standing alone and without 
any presidential determination to which deference might be 
owed, did not show why using court-martial procedures would 
be impracticable.27 
 
  17.  The Court did not rule that the President could not create such tribu-
nals without congressional authorization, carefully noting that the President 
had not claimed in Hamdan as it reached the Supreme Court that the Presi-
dent had the authority to create such tribunals in the face of a congressional 
prohibition because of his constitutional power as commander in chief of the 
armed forces. Id. at 2774 n.23. 
  18.  Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
  19.  Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739. 
  20. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774–75 (“The Government would have 
us . . . find in either the AUMF or the DTA specific, overriding authorization 
for the very commission that has been convened to try Hamdan.”). 
  21. Id. at 2775. 
  22. Id. at 2775. 
  23. Id. at 2786. 
  24.  10 U.S.C. § 836(b) (2000). 
  25. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2791. 
  26. Id. 
  27. Id. at 2792. TUSHNET_4FMT 6/15/2007 9:28:30 AM 
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Legislation might not be needed to overcome this difficulty. 
A presidential determination of impracticability might have 
been sufficient. That was not true of another aspect of the case. 
The Court held that, according to the law of war, those in 
Hamdan’s position—unlawful enemy combatants—were enti-
tled to the protection of so-called Common Article 3 of the Ge-
neva Conventions.28 That Article requires, the Court held, that 
even such combatants must not be sentenced “‘without previous 
judgment by a regularly constituted court affording all the judi-
cial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civi-
lized peoples.’”29 The existing military tribunals were not “regu-
larly constituted courts,” apparently because they were not 
created through the ordinary processes by which courts are 
usually created—that is, by legislation.30 Here too, the “regular 
constitution” requirement would seem to be satisfied by legisla-
tion creating tribunals without regard to their characteristics or 
the procedures used in them.31 Any law would do. 
What of the “indispensable” judicial guarantees? The Court 
held that provisions authorizing denial of access to the prisoner 
(or his lawyers) of evidence against him were an indispensable 
requirement of Common Article 3: “[A]t least absent express 
statutory provision to the contrary, information used to convict 
a person of a crime must be disclosed to him.”32 Note, though, 
that this requirement flowed from the UCMJ’s incorporation of 
the law of war.33 Congress could displace the law of war and 
expressly authorize tribunals that did indeed dispense with 
some procedures “recognized as indispensable by civilized peo-
 
  28. Id. at 2795–96. As a domestic constitutional lawyer, I am not in a po-
sition to assess whether, as I have been told by others more expert than I, this 
is a strained or unusual interpretation of the scope of Common Article 3. See 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. For present pur-
poses, all that matters is that the Court held as it did.  
  29. Id. at 2796 (quoting Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135). 
  30. Id. at 2796–97. 
  31. See  id. at 2797 (quoting Justice Kennedy’s explanation that regularly 
constituted courts are those established by congressional statute). 
  32. Id. at 2798 (emphasis added). 
  33. See  10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000) (“The provisions of this chapter conferring 
jurisdiction upon courts-martial do not deprive military commissions . . . tri-
bunals of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by 
statute or by the law of war may be tried by military commissions.” (emphasis 
added)); Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2799 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that 
Congress requires that “military commissions like the ones at issue conform to 
the ‘law of war’”). TUSHNET_4FMT 6/15/2007 9:28:30 AM 
1456  MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW  [91:1451 
 
ples,” although one can imagine that there might be some po-
litical obstacles to doing so in terms that acknowledged the de-
partures from such procedures. Congress would have to say 
that it was properly removing itself from the community of civi-
lized peoples, and might be reluctant to do so.34 
Hamdan, then, turned entirely on the proposition that 
Congress had not authorized the President to create tribunals 
with characteristics that departed from those required by the 
law of war.35 It said nothing about what procedures, if any, the 
Constitution required in such tribunals. The Bush administra-
tion proposed legislation that would have authorized it to con-
duct tribunals different only in trivial respects from those it 
had devised on its own.36 Had such a statute been enacted, 
Hamdan’s holding would not threaten the tribunals’ operation. 
Yet, the initial reaction to the administration’s proposal from 
important political actors was quite hostile, on the asserted 
ground that the proposal could not survive in court. So, for ex-
ample, Senator John Warner, who had served as Secretary of 
the Navy and was on the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
said, “I feel this bill has got to pass what I call the federal court 
muster, so this thing doesn’t get tangled up in the courts again 
and go all the way to the Supreme Court, and then down she 
goes again.”37 This might perhaps refer to constitutional prob-
lems other than those addressed in Hamdan, with Senator 
 
  34.  As the events played out, this concern was expressed as reluctance to 
state explicitly that the United States was willing to disregard its (interna-
tional) obligations under the Geneva Conventions, although the Military 
Commissions Act does make it clear that these obligations operate only on the 
international level and provide no benefits directly to those tried by military 
commissions.  See  Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 
§ 3(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 2602 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948(b)(g)) (“No alien 
unlawful enemy combatant subject to trial by military commission under this 
chapter may invoke the Geneva Conventions as a source of rights.”). 
  35.  More modestly, it is easy to read Hamdan as resting solely on that 
proposition—and, I believe, hard though not impossible to read it more sub-
stantively. 
  36. See  Kate Zernike, Crucial Senator Says a Few Problems Remain in 
Bill on Terror Tribunals, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2006, at A10 (summarizing the 
administration’s proposal). 
  37. Id. (quoting Sen. Warner). Senator Lindsay Graham offered a simi-
lar—and similarly slightly ambiguous—comment: “It would be unacceptable, 
legally, in my opinion, to give someone the death penalty in a trial where they 
never heard the evidence against them. ‘Trust us, you’re guilty, we’re going to 
execute you, but we can’t tell you why.’ That’s not going to pass muster; that’s 
not necessary.” Kate Zernike, Lawyers and G.O.P. Chiefs Resist Proposal on 
Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2006, at A24 (quoting Sen. Graham) (emphasis 
added). TUSHNET_4FMT 6/15/2007 9:28:30 AM 
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Warner concerned that, for example, non-separation-of-powers 
objections to the tribunals’ procedures might lead the courts to 
invalidate those procedures. Shortly after Hamdan, though, 
Senator Warner had been unambiguous, and his later state-
ment probably tracked his earlier views: 
We’ve got to structure his law in such a way that if it ever came back 
up through the Supreme Court, it will not be struck down. . . . It’s im-
portant for the credibility of the United States to put this issue at rest 
and let the world realize we’re affording them the protections as the 
Supreme Court outlined.38 
If, as I have argued, the Supreme Court had in fact not 
“outlined” any procedures in Hamdan, what were these refer-
ences about? I suggest that they reflected an intuitive pre-
sumption, widely shared but readily displaced, that constitu-
tional law as articulated by the Supreme Court provides the 
only legal framework—that is, the only framework larger than 
the particulars of specific statutes—for structuring emergency 
powers. As the debate over creating military tribunals devel-
oped, that presumption disappeared. Senator Warner, along 
with Senators Lindsay Graham and John McCain, advanced 
their views about the procedures the tribunals should use on 
the merits. They quickly stopped suggesting that the proce-
dures they preferred had been, or would be, required by the 
Supreme Court, and shifted to asserting that those procedures 
were, in their view, the ones that ought to be used, without ref-
erence to adjudicated constitutional law.39 At that moment, the 
political constitution replaced the legalized one. 
As events turned out, these Senators’ policy preferences 
with respect to procedures were relatively weak. The statute 
that was eventually adopted gave the President almost as 
much as he had sought initially.40 The defendant might get ac-
 
  38.  Kate Zernike & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Issue of Detainee Rights Creates 
a Divide on Capitol Hill, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2006, at A5 (quoting Sen. War-
ner) (emphasis added). 
  39. See,  e.g., Kate Zernike, Deal Reported Near on Rights of Suspects in 
Terror Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2006, at A20 (quoting Senator McCain’s 
statement, “Senator Warner and I and Senator Graham and others are not go-
ing to agree to changes in the definitions in Common Article 3, because that 
then sends the message to the world that we are not going to adhere fully to 
the Geneva Conventions.”). 
  40. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 
2600; Doyle McManus, Detainee Bill Boosts the GOP, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 
2006, at A1 (noting that the legislation “gave Bush most of what he wanted in 
substance”). But see Katyal, supra note 14, at 97–98 (describing the ways in 
which the commissions authorized by the Military Commissions Act differ TUSHNET_4FMT 6/15/2007 9:28:30 AM 
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cess to some items of evidence that the administration’s initial 
proposal would have denied him, and the administration cer-
tainly lost the power to decide, entirely at its own discretion, 
which evidence would be withheld.41 But, one might be skepti-
cal about the extent to which military prosecutors would actu-
ally have withheld much more than the newly enacted statute 
allows them to withhold. 
II.  HAMDAN AND THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION  
OF EMERGENCY POWERS   
The Hamdan decision and its aftermath illustrates what I 
call the political constitution of emergency powers, by which I 
mean nothing more elaborate than that (a) the way in which 
emergency powers are structured in a well-functioning democ-
racy is a matter of fundamental importance, (b) the way in 
which they are structured is at least as much a product of the 
fundamental structures of political power—the distribution of 
authority between executive and legislature, only a small part 
of which flows from the Constitution’s texts or judicial prece-
dents—as it is of judicially interpreted law, and (c) these struc-
tures are as permanent as those found in the Constitution’s 
written text. The role of the courts in a constitution of emer-
gency powers structured importantly by political interactions 
between executive and legislature is, I suggest, a secondary or 
collateral issue, important only in some circumstances.42 
Discussions of the issues addressed here frequently advert 
to Justice Robert Jackson’s concurring opinion in the Steel Sei-
zure Case,43 and I will as well. The opinion divided separation 
 
from those the administration initially established). 
  41. Compare  Military Order—Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain 
Non-citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 37 WEEKLY  COMP.  PRES.  DOC. 
1665 (Nov. 19, 2001) (allowing admission of all evidence with probative value, 
as determined by the presiding officer of the military commission), with Mili-
tary Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 
2609 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 949a(b)(2)(F)) (providing for the exclusion of 
evidence where the probative value is outweighed by unfair prejudice, in the 
consideration of the military judge). 
  42.  And, even in those circumstances, one might plausibly contend that 
the role of the courts should be small, for reasons connected less to concerns 
about judicial capacity than to the political structures more directly. Judicial 
capacity concerns permeate POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 5 passim, al-
though as I discuss below, they deal briefly with some aspects of congressional 
capacity. See infra text accompanying notes 83–85. 
  43.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring). TUSHNET_4FMT 6/15/2007 9:28:30 AM 
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of powers problems into three categories.44 From the perspec-
tive opened up by the idea of a political constitution of emer-
gency powers, though, there is only a single category. I take as 
my opening text the second category, dealing with situations in 
which Congress had neither granted power to, nor withheld 
power from, the President: 
[T]here is a zone of twilight in which [the President] and Congress 
may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncer-
tain. . . . In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on 
the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather 
than on abstract theories of law.45 
One can treat the term test as modestly ambiguous. Justice 
Jackson appeared to offer his formulation as a test the courts 
could use to determine whether the President’s action in this 
twilight zone was constitutionally permissible,46 although it is 
manifestly unsuitable as a judicially administrable test.47 We 
can learn more from Justice Jackson if we treat him as refer-
ring to contests of power between President and Congress. That 
is, when Congress and the President have concurrent power, 
the law we end up with results from “the imperatives of events 
and contemporary imponderables.” I suggest that this is 
equally true in the other two categories. That is, the outcome of 
any (con)test of power is likely to depend on the interplay of 
contingent political forces far more than on whatever constitu-
tional interpretations the courts—or anyone else—offers. 
The Hamdan episode is one in which contingent political 
forces shifted the problem from the third category, involving a 
congressional prohibition, to the first, involving a congressional 
authorization. The reason is straightforward: shortly before a 
mid-term election in which the prospects for the President’s 
party appeared likely to turn solely on defining a sharp differ-
ence between the position taken by his party and that taken by 
most Democrats on the issue of addressing terrorism, no Re-
publican, even those who initially expressed concerns about ex-
pansive assertions of presidential power, had much of an inter-
est in actually curbing that power.48 Most Republicans agreed 
 
  44. Id. 
  45. Id. at 637. 
  46. Id. at 635. 
  47.  How, for example, could a court invoke an “imponderable” to explain 
why it resolved a controversy in Category Two in favor of or against the Presi-
dent? 
  48.  This analysis turns on the political circumstances at the time the 
statute was being considered and when it was enacted. Again, as events TUSHNET_4FMT 6/15/2007 9:28:30 AM 
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with the President on the merits, and those who did not needed 
no more than a bit of cover, provided by characterizing the re-
sulting legislation as a “compromise” between them and the 
President. And, given the political circumstances, Democrats 
appeared unwilling to use the relatively limited political re-
sources they had to fight on this battleground, perhaps believ-
ing that others presented more favorable prospects. So, in the 
end, Congress authorized the President to conduct military tri-
bunals using procedures not dramatically different from those 
found unauthorized in Hamdan.49 
There is, though, an additional part of the story, which is 
not irrelevant to what follows in my analysis. Some aspects of 
the new statute are clearly constitutionally vulnerable.50 Re-
solving the constitutional challenges will take some time, dur-
ing which the array of political power might change. In particu-
lar, the administration in place in 2009 and thereafter might 
have a different set of policy positions, and face a different set 
of political constraints, than the present administration. What 
actually happens at that point may differ from what the statute 
appears to authorize. And, because practice plays a large role 
in determining what constitutional law in this area is, we may 
not know for some time what the constitutionally mandated or 
permissible distribution of authority between the President and 
Congress is. 
Suppose Congress had in fact imposed—or, as will turn out 
to be relevant, purported to impose—substantial limits on the 
President’s preferred procedures in the military tribunals. The 
President might of course have vetoed the legislation, citing 
 
played out, other matters—a congressional sex scandal and some sort of activ-
ity by North Korea with respect to its nuclear weapons—affected the political 
terrain as well. See, e.g., Charles Babington & Jonathan Weisman, Rep. Foley 
Quits in Page Scandal, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2006, at A1; Anthony Faiola & 
Maureen Fan, North Korea’s Political, Economic Gamble, WASH. POST, Oct. 
10, 2006, at A12. 
  49.  One can imagine different outcomes, resulting from different “impera-
tives of events.” For example, suppose Hamdan had been decided at a time 
when Congress was already controlled by Democrats with no election looming, 
and when the President had been abandoned by major elements of his party. 
Under those circumstances, the legislative response to Hamdan might well be 
much farther from the President’s policy preferences than the Military Com-
missions Act is. 
  50.  For an initial analysis, which argues that the constitutionally vulner-
able provisions should be interpreted so as to conform to the Constitution, and 
that the provisions can fairly be so interpreted, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., & 
Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the 
War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming June 2007). TUSHNET_4FMT 6/15/2007 9:28:30 AM 
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both policy arguments for the procedures he preferred and con-
stitutional objections to congressional specification of proce-
dures. Those constitutional objections would rest on the propo-
sition that the manner in which the military dealt with those it 
held as enemy combatants in the midst of an ongoing conflict 
was essentially a question of military tactics committed by the 
Constitution to the President in his capacity as commander in 
chief.51 In the political conditions in the fall of 2006, though, a 
veto was unlikely because, without real talent and luck in pre-
senting the position to the public, a veto would place the Presi-
dent (and Republicans) in a position of delaying the start of the 
military tribunals. 
Alternatively, the President might have signed the statute 
and announced his intention to disregard its unconstitutional 
restrictions on presidential power, openly inviting a judicial 
challenge to his actions. Note that, structurally, this would 
simply replicate the pre-Hamdan situation: there would be a 
statute on the books, and a pending legal challenge that might 
be resolved against the President. Until that challenge was re-
solved, the status quo would be, again, the status quo pre-
Hamdan: enemy combatants held without access to a military 
tribunal. Nor could we be confident that the constitutional chal-
lenge would be resolved quickly on the basis of the Hamdan 
precedent, because, as I have argued, Hamdan says nothing 
about the constitutional distribution of substantive power be-
tween President and Congress.52 
Now, suppose that—one, two, or more years from now—the 
courts definitively resolve the constitutional questions against 
the President. What happens next? Not necessarily the imple-
mentation of the (hypothesized) statutory procedures. A Presi-
dent in a weak political position would of course have to im-
plement those procedures, as would a President (remember, we 
might be dealing with the person in office in 2009 or after) who 
agreed that the congressionally prescribed procedures were 
good policy. What, though, of a President who both rejected 
those procedures and was in a strong political position? Such a 
President would, I am sure, propose new legislation to deal 
with enemy combatants, and might obtain it because of the po-
litical strength of his or her position. 
 
  51.  So, for example, the President might claim that the way in which en-
emy combatants were treated, even procedurally, would affect the way in 
which enemies in the field would conduct their operations. 
  52. See  supra  notes 6–12 and accompanying text. TUSHNET_4FMT 6/15/2007 9:28:30 AM 
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To return to Justice Jackson’s analysis, I have argued that 
the way in which tests of power are resolved when Congress 
purports to restrict the President’s powers is indistinguishable 
from the way in which they are resolved in the “zone of twi-
light.” Everything will “depend on the imperatives of events 
and contemporary imponderables,” not “law” in the usual 
sense. Or, put another way (and as I would prefer) the inter-
play of events and contemporary imponderables—that is, poli-
tics—is constitutional law in this domain. 
One can fairly ask, though, why the analysis I have out-
lined should be called constitutional rather than (merely) po-
litical. The answer, I believe, is that the analysis of how politics 
operates rests on aspects of the nation’s political structure—
some rooted in the Constitution, others not—that are as recal-
citrant to change as any provisions written into the Constitu-
tion. Or, put another way, we know that constitutional change 
occurs without changes in constitutional text—either by judi-
cial interpretation or through the processes of informal 
“amendment” or development that scholars such as Bruce Ac-
kerman and David Strauss have identified.53 Many of us, 
though of course not all, are comfortable in calling these 
changes constitutional rather than merely political because we 
believe that the outcomes are as fixed in our political order as 
are outcomes written into the constitutional text—that is, not 
unrevisable (as the Constitution’s written provisions are for-
mally revisable by amendment pursuant to Article V), but re-
calcitrant to change. 
III.  THE POLITICS OF SEPARATION OF POWERS   
What, then, are the underlying constitutional structures 
out of which the politics I have discussed emerge?54 Two are 
obvious: the regular election cycle, and the general idea of 
 
  53. See B RUCE  ACKERMAN,  WE THE PEOPLE  2:  TRANSFORMATIONS  383–
420 (1998) (arguing that the Constitution has in fact been altered outside the 
formal amendment process); David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitu-
tional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457, 1461 (2001) (describing “formal 
constitutional amendments of the kind Article V envisions” as only “incidental 
to the main processes of constitutional change”). 
  54.  Most of the analysis that follows deals with separation of powers gen-
erally, referring only incidentally to particular features of separation of powers 
during emergencies. This Article is part of a larger project on the relation be-
tween politics and emergencies in political theory and practice, including the 
practice of parliamentary systems. TUSHNET_4FMT 6/15/2007 9:28:30 AM 
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separation of powers.55 Some issues, varying depending on the 
surrounding social and political conditions, get thrust to the 
fore as an election approaches. So, for example, national anti-
crime legislation rose to the top of the political agenda in elec-
tion years when the public perceived crime to be rising.56 And 
today, we can expect legislation related to terrorism to be 
pushed to the top of the agenda in election years. Hamdan pro-
vided the occasion for proposing some terrorism-related legisla-
tion in 2006, but I am confident that, had Hamdan not been de-
cided, or had it been decided in a way not inducing the 
President to propose legislation, nonetheless some terrorism-
related legislation would have been put forward.57 
At the most abstract level, separation of powers is about 
the political Constitution. The general account of separation of 
powers offered in The Federalist, for example, treats politics as 
the mode in which separation of powers operates, with ambi-
tion set against ambition.58 Everyone knows, of course, that the 
Founders’ specific vision of ambition countering ambition no 
longer describes separation of powers in the modern constitu-
tional system, essentially because of the unanticipated—or at 
least undesired—rise of political parties.59 And yet, it is easy 
enough to insert political parties into the general separation of 
powers system and focus on the ways in which politicians’ rela-
tions to their political parties, and to their opponents’ parties, 
provides some structure for political contention over who 
should exercise how much power in what circumstances. 
 
  55.  I do not insist that these are analytically distinct, and would have no 
objection to describing the regular election cycle as an aspect of the general 
separation of powers. 
  56.  The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 
90-351, 82 Stat. 197, and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, are good examples. 
  57.  Some modest support for this proposition is the administration’s effort 
to obtain legislative authorization for its program of surveillance of certain 
cross-border communications, operated by the National Security Agency. See, 
e.g., Eric Lichtblau & Scott Shane, Bush is Pressed over New Report on Sur-
veillance, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2006, at A1. Hamdan induced the administra-
tion to place greater weight behind legislation authorizing military commis-
sions; I suspect that, in the absence of Hamdan, equivalent weight would have 
been placed behind the surveillance legislation. 
 58.  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 252 (James Madison) (Terence 
Ball ed., 2003) (“Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”). 
  59. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not 
Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2313 (2006). TUSHNET_4FMT 6/15/2007 9:28:30 AM 
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The reason is this: as an analytic matter, there might be a 
large number of ways in which political parties are integrated 
into political systems, but deeply embedded practices in the 
United States dramatically reduce the number of possibilities. 
Nearly every jurisdiction uses a one-member-per-district, plu-
rality winner rule to select the winner of an election.60 Such a 
rule encourages the development of no more than two parties.61 
Another practice, which emerged early, is that presidential 
elections are resolved in national campaigns, not through the 
selection of local notables by each state’s electors followed by 
selection of the President by the House of Representatives.62 
These two practices push strongly in the direction of having a 
relatively small number of nationally organized parties. 
Within the general category of nationally organized politi-
cal parties we can observe some more specific variants. Histori-
cally, the national political parties in the United States have 
been coalitions of local parties held together by a common in-
terest in obtaining disparate policies from the national gov-
ernment.63 To see how national parties can be coalitions of dis-
parate groups, consider a simplified example, in which there 
are only two issues that are not strongly related to each other—
domestic industrial policy and foreign policy, perhaps. One 
party contains advocates of a strongly interventionist national 
government in domestic affairs, the other a laissez-faire faction. 
What of those who care more about foreign than domestic pol-
icy—the isolationists and the multilateralists? It might hap-
pen—perhaps because of the choices specific political leaders 
make, perhaps by chance—that Party A becomes committed to 
 
 60.  WILLIAM G. MAYER, THE DIVIDED DEMOCRATS: IDEOLOGICAL UNITY, 
PARTY REFORM, AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 95 (1996). 
  61.  For a discussion, see MAURICE DUVERGER, PARTY POLITICS AND PRES-
SURE GROUPS 23–32 (1972). 
  62. See  JAMES  MACGREGOR  BURNS,  THE  DEADLOCK OF DEMOCRACY: 
FOUR-PARTY POLITICS IN AMERICA 24–42 (1963). 
  63. See EVERETT CARLL LADD, JR. & CHARLES D. HADLEY, TRANSFORMA-
TIONS OF THE AMERICAN  PARTY  SYSTEM:  POLITICAL  COALITIONS FROM THE 
NEW DEAL TO THE 1970S 303 (2d ed. 1978) (describing the traditional view of 
the modern period, in which the role of local parties has diminished, as one in 
which the two national parties in the United States seek to “mobilize varying 
segments of the electorate through diverse appeals across a series of axes of 
conflict”). One overarching policy, which held parties together for a long time, 
is patronage. A. JAMES REICHLEY, THE LIFE OF THE PARTIES: A HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES 251 (1992). You might disagree with your party 
allies on many issues, but combine with them to gain control of the national 
government and the jobs at its disposal. See id. TUSHNET_4FMT 6/15/2007 9:28:30 AM 
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a strongly interventionist domestic program and an isolationist 
foreign policy, Party B to laissez-faire and multilateralism. 
Strong isolationists who, all things considered, would prefer 
laissez-faire domestic policies might end up voting for Party A 
because they care more about getting an isolationist foreign 
policy than they do about getting a laissez-faire domestic pol-
icy.64 
Political parties need not be coalitions, though. They might 
be ideologically unified, as has increasingly been the case in re-
cent decades, more so, or more quickly, for the Republican 
Party than for the Democratic Party.65 Whether parties are coa-
litions or ideologically unified affects the operation of the mod-
ern separation of powers system.66 
Suppose we consider the political constitution along two 
dimensions, one involving the structure of the party system and 
the other whether the national government is under unified or 
divided party control.67 The political constitution of emergency 
 
  64.  Of course this example is based on what national political parties have 
been through most of United States history. In the modern era, for example, 
the Democratic Party was a coalition between Northern urban liberals and 
Southern racial conservatives, held together in part by patronage and in part 
by commitments in both factions, though with different degrees of strength, to 
domestic economic policies requiring national legislative action—supporting 
agricultural production in the South, manufacturing in the North. See LADD & 
HADLEY, supra note 63, at 129–34 (describing Southern support for New Deal 
programs); REICHLEY,  supra note 63, at 206–09. And the Republican Party 
joined northeastern internationalists and midwestern isolationists in a coali-
tion held together by a commitment to domestic policies motivated by a nerv-
ousness about the expansion of government during the New Deal and after. 
See id. at 251–52 (describing the positions of Republicans during the presi-
dency of Dwight D. Eisenhower). 
  65. See M AYER,  supra note 60, passim  (arguing that Democrats have 
found it more difficult to maintain party unity than Republicans). 
  66.  I do not discuss here in any detail some of the features of that system’s 
operation when one party is ideologically unified and the other is a coalition, 
although I will mention some in passing. Nor will I devote attention to the ef-
fects of partially divided government, that is, one in which one party controls 
the presidency and one but not both houses of Congress. 
  67.  Actually divided government can occur even when the government is 
nominally unified, if the minority party in Congress is able to use procedural 
devices, such as the filibuster in the United States Senate, that have the effect 
of imposing supermajority requirements (where the required supermajority is 
larger than the actual one). I note, though, that a device that is formally 
available may not be politically available in some circumstances, as demon-
strated by the controversy over the use of a filibuster on judicial nominations, 
and its resolution through a compromise whose strength has not yet been 
tested. See Byron York, Dr. Frist’s Operation: How the Senate Majority Leader 
Played a Game of Filibuster Chicken, NAT’L REV., June 20, 2005, at 17 (de-TUSHNET_4FMT 6/15/2007 9:28:30 AM 
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powers will typically generate different outcomes in each of the 
relevant categories. 
The classical version of separation of powers—again, ambi-
tion countering ambition—will arise when we have divided 
government with ideologically unified parties.68 Not the inter-
ests of the man but the interests of the party will be conjoined 
to the interests of the place, as a President and his supporters 
in Congress seek to advance presidential prerogatives against 
the resistance of a unified competing party in Congress.69 Con-
tests will be resolved by the balance of political forces, with 
each side deploying the weapons available to it in political con-
tention: internal legislative rules to obstruct or structure the 
progress of a proposal through Congress, congressional over-
sight hearings, the rhetorical resources of the presidency, and 
the like.70 
The situation is not dramatically different with divided 
government and parties that are coalitions. Added to the mix 
will be efforts by the supporters of presidential or congressional 
 
scribing how the Republican threat of the “nuclear option” constrained Democ-
ratic use of the filibuster). Similarly, Democrats formally had the power to fili-
buster the military tribunals legislation, but were constrained politically to 
refrain from doing so. See Editorial, Rushing Off a Cliff, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 
2006, at A22. 
  68.  In what follows, I focus entirely on the way in which parties operate 
within the institutions of national government. Political scientists distinguish 
between the “party-in-government,” my concern here, and the “party-in-the-
electorate,” those who support the party at election time. See, e.g., V.O. KEY, 
JR., POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS 163–65 (1964). The reason I 
focus on the “party-in-government” is that it is the mechanism by which the 
modern separation-of-powers system works. Ultimately, of course, there is 
some relation between those who form the party-in-government and their con-
stituents in the party-in-the-electorate. However, that relation is a complex 
one, including such features as gerrymandering, which loosens the control 
some constituents in the party-as-electorate have over their representative. 
See, e.g., Note, A New Map: Partisan Gerrymandering as a Federalism In-
quiry, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1196, 1211 (2004). I do not have even preliminary 
thoughts on the way in which the relation between the party-in-the-electorate 
and the party-in-government affects the operation of separation of powers. 
  69.  This is true even if the competition is only for the moment, with the 
party controlling Congress hoping to take over the presidency in the next elec-
tion. That is, one can expect that a party that strongly defends presidential 
prerogatives, but not Congress, when it controls the presidency, will abandon 
that position if its opponents win the presidency and it takes over Congress. 
  70.  It is probably worth emphasizing that these contests can occur over 
the entire terrain of policy. That is, a President who seeks to advance a spe-
cific national security agenda may be forced to make concessions with respect 
to that agenda because his opponents threaten to thwart his ability to imple-
ment some policy unrelated to national security. TUSHNET_4FMT 6/15/2007 9:28:30 AM 
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prerogative to peel away some members of the party controlling 
the presidency or Congress. This will be possible to the extent 
that the issues that divide and unite coalitions include either 
issues about congressional and presidential power as such,71 or 
about the specific policy issue that divides the President and 
the party controlling Congress.72 Again, the contest will be re-
solved politically, although we can expect the President to pre-
vail somewhat more often here than in the prior scenario be-
cause the party controlling Congress will have to expend more 
political resources to bring enough members of the President’s 
party to its side than it has to when it is ideologically unified in 
opposition to the President. 
The President’s prospects improve further when there is 
unified government with parties that are coalitions, although 
presidential success is not guaranteed. The reason is that there 
is some chance that the minority party may be able to pull 
away enough members of the President’s (coalitional) party for 
the minority party to prevail on specific issues.73 
 
  71.  In this configuration, we might describe a “presidential party” consist-
ing of political officials in the executive branch and some members of Con-
gress, and a “congressional party” consisting almost entirely of members of 
Congress, although perhaps with some allies in the executive branch. See 
BURNS, supra note 62, at 241–64 (arguing that both major parties are divided 
into presidential and congressional parties, each of which has distinctive in-
terests and tendencies). 
For completeness, I should mention also the possibility that some of those 
who work in the executive bureaucracy might act as members of the congres-
sional party or even the opposition party (for example, by leaking information 
for political purposes). For an argument that contemporary legal analyses fail 
to take the political and legal role of bureaucrats seriously enough, see ED-
WARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW FOR THE 
MODERN STATE 46 (2005). 
  72.  That is, it does not matter much whether, for example, a Congress 
controlled by Democrats opposes presidential power as such or a Republican 
President’s policies about military tribunals, as long as some Republicans in 
Congress care about either congressional power or oppose the President’s poli-
cies on the merits. 
  73.  In the most general terms, this describes the development of national 
domestic policy during the presidency of John F. Kennedy and the first years 
of the presidency of William J. Clinton, when Democrats also controlled Con-
gress but were unable to enact the full presidential agenda because the minor-
ity Republicans obtained enough votes from Democrats to block presidential 
initiatives. See, e.g., Dana Priest, Democrats Pull the Plug on Health Care Re-
form, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1994, at A1 (describing the political context of the 
failure of President Clinton’s health care proposals); Katharine Q. Seelye, 
Crime Bill Fails on a House Vote, Stunning Clinton, N.Y.  TIMES, Aug. 12, 
1994, at A1 (describing how fifty-eight Democrats voted with Republicans to 
block passage of an early version of President Clinton’s crime bill). TUSHNET_4FMT 6/15/2007 9:28:30 AM 
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The final category is unified government with ideologically 
organized parties.74 Here the President gets what he asks for, 
as in the Military Commissions Act.75 Is this a matter of con-
cern for the political constitution of emergency powers? If one 
thought that the classical separation of powers model required 
outcomes that represented compromises between presidents 
and Congress, one might find this troubling. But, I wonder 
whether it should be troubling as a matter of constitutional de-
sign, for two reasons. There is no particular reason to think 
that unified government with ideologically organized parties is 
a permanent condition, and if it is not, whatever might be trou-
bling about the current situation may disappear. More impor-
tant, it is entirely unclear that the classical version of separa-
tion of powers required any substantive outcomes at all, and in 
particular whether it envisioned compromises between Presi-
dent and Congress over the division of power. It may be—I be-
lieve it is—that the legalized Constitution contemplated that 
all separation of powers issues would fall in Justice Jackson’s 
second category.76 If so, whatever the political process produces 
is what the Constitution requires (or permits, if you prefer).77 
I believe that the configuration of political power prior to 
the 2006 elections fueled some of the more feverish expressions 
supporting a strong judicial role in assessing the constitutional-
ity of recent executive and legislative initiatives. Yet, wholly 
apart from concerns one might have about the courts’ capacity 
to do a decent job,78 I wonder whether it makes sense to design 
our constitutional structures to deal with a temporary configu-
ration of political power. Or, put another way, as a matter of 
 
  74.  Or perhaps it is unified government with the majority party being 
ideologically coherent and the minority being a coalitional party (or closer to 
being one than to being ideologically coherent). 
  75.  Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 
(enrolled as agreed to or passed by both House and Senate, Sept. 29, 2006). 
Perhaps more accurately, the Republican Party is largely unified ideologically, 
and dissidents on some issues such as Senator Arlen Specter are not so disaf-
fected as to fight their party too strenuously. 
  76. See  supra text accompanying note 45. 
  77.  On this view, the distribution of power between Congress and the 
President is an issue like the selection of the highest marginal rate for the in-
come tax—something to be determined entirely by politics (with perhaps some 
caveat about ensuring that the result falls within some very wide boundaries).  
  78.  This is true either because they will be unduly intrusive on those ini-
tiatives even though they lack information and expertise, or because they will 
be unduly deferential to those initiatives—for, I suppose, exactly the same 
reasons. TUSHNET_4FMT 6/15/2007 9:28:30 AM 
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abstract principle it might make sense to preserve a strong role 
for the courts when one ideologically unified party controls both 
political branches of government, but it seems to me quite diffi-
cult to design a judicially administrable doctrine that will say, 
“Last year you properly played a strong role, but this year, af-
ter the elections changed things, you can’t.” 
So far I have discussed the two dimensions—the composi-
tion of government and the composition of the parties—in 
rather skeletal terms. I turn now to some slightly more detailed 
propositions, primarily to indicate how some flesh might be put 
on the bones of the account without insisting that the details I 
sketch are completely accurate. Consider first what might hap-
pen immediately after provocations that the President de-
scribes as triggering the need for emergency power. Political 
scientists have described a “rally round the flag” effect, which 
in all party configurations increases support for the Presi-
dent.79 In the terms I have used, the “rally round the flag” ef-
fect may push the political system toward unified govern-
ment.80 Political scientists also observe, though, that this effect 
dissipates, and the provocation’s size might affect the size of 
the effect and the speed with which it dissipates.81 A formally 
divided government might seem more unified for a while, then 
revert to its prior divided state. 
Second, assume that we are in one of the configurations of 
power in which some degree of congressional ambition seeks to 
counter presidential ambition.82 How might the politics of that 
confrontation play itself out? Some suggest that the President 
 
  79. See,  e.g., Marc J. Hetherington & Michael Nelson, Anatomy of a Rally 
Effect: George W. Bush and the War on Terrorism, PS: POL. SCI. & POL., Jan. 
2003, at 37, 37 (describing the effect and providing references to the political 
science literature). 
  80.  I thank Adrian Vermeule for this observation. See Eric A. Posner & 
Adrian Vermeule, Emergencies and Democratic Failure, 92 VA. L. REV. 1091, 
1123, 1138 (2006). 
  81. See Jong R. Lee, Rallying Around the Flag: Foreign Policy Events and 
Presidential Popularity, 7 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 252, 253–55 (1977) (finding 
“some evidence” that the size but not the duration of changes in presidential 
popularity are “influenced by the salience of event[s]”). 
  82.  I put it this way primarily for expository convenience. There is a sense 
among commentators that emergencies trigger executive initiatives—
executive ambition—to which legislatures respond. That may be so in general, 
but I believe that much depends on the prior state of executive-legislative 
power relations, and that analytically we should be alert to the possibility that 
initiatives might emerge from an energized legislature, to be countered by ex-
ecutive ambition. TUSHNET_4FMT 6/15/2007 9:28:30 AM 
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has a systematic advantage over Congress.83 The executive 
branch is nominally unified under the President, and so can 
develop a single position, whereas Congress has many members 
who seek to advance both a general view and more parochial 
interests.84 The President has readier access to relevant infor-
mation than Congress does, and can keep the information se-
cret even from Congress.85 Finally, the President can act 
quickly, whereas Congress takes time to deliberate and enact 
legislation.86 
One might wonder, though, about whether these character-
istics give the President much of an advantage over Congress, 
except in the very short run. It is easy to exaggerate the unity 
within the executive; it is part of the folklore of Washington, for 
example, that the Department of State and the Department of 
Defense are regularly at odds over the proper response to ex-
ternal threats. Leaks from within the executive bureaucracy 
are common, and not always at the behest of the President. 
Specialized committees and their professional staff members 
can, over time, acquire expertise and information equivalent to, 
or exceeding, that of the President’s political appointees and 
employees in the executive bureaucracy. Congress can organize 
itself to engage in real-time oversight of executive operations, 
and at least has attempted to do so by requiring that the Presi-
dent notify a select group of congressional leaders of some op-
erations.87 
 
  83. See,  e.g., POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 5, at 47 (including among 
the “institutional disadvantages” of Congress a “lack of information about 
what is happening” and an “inability to act quickly and with one voice”). 
  84. Id. at 170. 
  85. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 
(1936) (in foreign affairs, the President “has his confidential sources of infor-
mation”). 
  86.  See, e.g., POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 5, at 170 (“Congressional 
deliberation is slow and unsuited for emergencies. Congress has trouble keep-
ing secrets and is always vulnerable to obstructionism at the behest of mem-
bers of Congress who place the interests of their constituents ahead of those of 
the nation as a whole.”). 
  87. See  National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 413(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. 
2006) (“The President shall ensure that the congressional intelligence commit-
tees are kept fully and currently informed of the intelligence activities of the 
United States.”); id. § 413(b)(1) (“[T]he Director of Central Intelligence . . . 
shall keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently in-
formed of all covert actions. . . .”). The latter provision has come to be under-
stood as allowing disclosure only to the so-called Gang of Eight, the party 
leaders and chairs and ranking members of the House and Senate Intelligence 
Committees. See Scott Shane, Report Questions Legality of Briefings on Sur-TUSHNET_4FMT 6/15/2007 9:28:30 AM 
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Focusing on oversight rather than legislation brings an ad-
ditional consideration into view. Congress and the President in-
teract regularly, and on a large range of issues. Repeat players, 
including the President, have to keep the entire playing field in 
mind. A President who capitalizes on a momentary advantage 
with respect to a particular emergency-related issue might find 
himself facing retaliation, not over emergency-related issues, 
but over nominations to unrelated executive positions or over 
some purely domestic program. 
None of this is to say that claims about the President’s ad-
vantages in emergencies are entirely mistaken, but only that 
one can easily overstate them and, in particular, overestimate 
the extent to which temporary advantages translate into per-
manent ones. In my view, the political configurations I have 
described—unified versus divided government and the types of 
political parties we have—are more important in structuring 
the constitution of emergency powers than the differences be-
tween the institutional characteristics of the executive branch 
and Congress. The preceding pages have tried to show that the 
idea of having a political constitution of emergency powers is 
conceptually coherent; it allows for analysis at least as system-
atic as that available when we deal with a legalized constitu-
tion, and draws upon structures embedded in the written con-
stitution nearly as firmly as the document’s words themselves. 
  CONCLUSION   
Is the political constitution of emergency powers that we 
seem to have normatively attractive? To some extent one can-
not answer that question without addressing the most general 
questions about the attractiveness of a legalized constitution: 
how often, and on what issues of how much importance, will 
courts enforce the legalized constitution appropriately (from 
one’s own normative perspective)?88 To the extent that nar-
rower questions are possible, I would observe that the political 
constitution of emergency powers deals with who as between 
President and Congress gets to make substantive decisions. It 
does not deal with whether those decisions, once made, are con-
 
veillance, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2006, at A19 (describing the controversy over 
whether disclosure of a surveillance program to the “Gang of Eight” was con-
sistent with the National Security Act). 
  88.  The best analysis of which I am aware is Wojciech Sadurski, Judicial 
Review and the Protection of Constitutional Rights, 22 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 
275 (2002). TUSHNET_4FMT 6/15/2007 9:28:30 AM 
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sistent with what I earlier called substantive constitutional 
norms—most importantly the individual rights protected by the 
Constitution. Nor does it deal with the distribution of decision-
making authority between the political branches on the one 
side and the courts on the other.89 Senator Specter asserted 
that the courts would hold unconstitutional some of the restric-
tions on the availability of habeas corpus contained in the mili-
tary tribunals statute.90 He might be right, or he might be 
wrong, but the political constitution of emergency powers does 
leave that constitutional question to the courts. Similarly with 
the statute’s provisions dealing with the admissibility of evi-
dence before such tribunals—the provisions may be unconstitu-
tional in some applications, and the political constitution of 
emergency powers allows the courts to so hold. The political 
constitution of emergency powers can fit comfortably with a le-
galized constitution of individual rights.91 
Justice Stevens ended his opinion in Hamdan with a paean 
to the Rule of Law.92 Many of those who thought that the Presi-
dent’s military commissions were unconstitutional have similar 
qualms about the Military Commissions Act.93 But, if Hamdan 
is a triumph of the Rule of Law, so must be the Military Com-
missions Act. (Now apply the logical rule of contraposition.)94 
 
  89.  One exception is that the political constitution excludes the courts 
from deciding what the Constitution prescribes to be the distribution of power 
between the President and Congress. That exclusion might result from a defi-
nition of what the political constitution is, or, as I would prefer, from an 
analysis of the Constitution that produces the conclusion that the Constitution 
prescribes no distribution of power at all, but only sets up a framework of po-
litical contestation over that question. 
 90.  152  CONG. REC. S10264 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (statement of Sen. 
Specter). 
  91.  The fit might be comfortable, but the entire ensemble might be dis-
tasteful to those who believe that only a fully legalized constitution is likely to 
be normatively attractive. 
  92.  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2798 (2006). 
  93. See Press Release, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, Center for Constitu-
tional Rights Argues to Court that Military Commissions Act is Unconstitu-
tional (Nov. 2, 2006), http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/reports/report.asp?ObjID= 
SHznm0ARDp&Content=881; Press Release, Sen. Patrick Leahy, Leahy Op-
poses ‘Flagrantly Unconstitutional’ Military Commission Bill (Sept. 27, 2006), 
available at 2006 WLNR 17083902. 
  94.  That rule is: If P implies Q, then not-P implies not-Q. See Layman E. 
Allen, Symbolic Logic: A Razor-Edged Tool for Drafting and Interpreting Legal 
Documents, 66 YALE L.J. 832, 841 (1957). 